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ABSTRACT

Thunder in the Desert: Commercial
Air Travel and Tourism in
Las Vegas, 1959-2001
by

Daniel Bubb

Dr. Eugene Moehring,
Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f History
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

This thesis carefully examines the relationship between the commercial air travel
and tourist industries in Las Vegas, especially highlighting their unprecedented growth in
the second half o f the twentieth century. It not only provides an accurate historic account
o f both industries, but clearly delineates the dependence o f tourism on commercial air
service as the primary source o f transportation to Las Vegas.
While the thesis’s overarching theme focuses on commercial air travel and
tourism, it also contains a set o f subthemes, one o f which highlights the symbiotic
relationship o f the commercial air travel industry with the Strip "mega-resorts,” and the
air charter and junket industries, such as Warren Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines (Chapter 2).
A second significant subtheme that the thesis explores, is the im pact that airlin e
deregulation had on Las Vegas, especially noting the remarkable increase in the num ber
o f air carriers providing service to Las Vegas, and the explosive growth in M cCarran
iii
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A irport's passenger volume. The epilogue provides a future outlook for both industries
in addition to summarizing all o f the themes presented throughout the discussion.

IV
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PROLOGUE
Like the hotel and the train before it, the airplane quickly became a vital
component o f western tourism. Following the transition period between the Wright
brothers’ epic flight in 1902 and the technology developed during World W ar II, the
airline industry was bom . The nation witnessed the birth o f the age o f m odem air travel
in the United States when President Calvin Coolidge signed the Air Commerce Act on
May 20, 1926. O f course it took many years before the airplane seriously rivaled the
automobile and bus as the preferred way to travel to distant destinations, but tourists and
business passengers recognized the form er's advantages.' As an altemative to spending
numerous hours driving in their cars or riding on uncomfortable and crowded buses,
Americans gradually embraced airplanes as the more comfortable means to reach their
destinations. In m any parts o f rural America, like Alaska, airplanes were the only way to
travel until modem highways finally arrived.
Even though air travel became even more popular after World War II, it
nevertheless experienced a number o f setbacks, including lack o f airport funding. The
reasons for this problem were numerous. First, airport constmction was expensive,
especially for poor towns in places like the South or smaller cities with a m eager tax
base. Second, these facilities consumed large amounts o f valuable land, which drew the
opposition o f local real estate developers, frequently resulting in protracted litigation as
well as disputes over the use o f convenient domain. In addition, local residents
complained about the noise. But, political and business leaders pushed forward with
constmction plans, because they realized how important these projects would become to
the local economy. W hile there was some constmction in larger cities during the 1920s,
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the G reat Crash and subsequent depression dramatically cut back on building budgets.
Fortunately, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, with its emphasis on relief spending,
financed a renaissance o f airport and highway construction through the PWA, WPA,
FERA, CW A, and other alphabet agencies. O f course, demand had been diminished by
the nation’s spiraling unemployment rate. In the 1930s, many families had little
disposable income and vacation time, which, in addition to expensive airfares, limited
their travel plans.
Soon after the war ended, travel and tourism boomed. Record numbers o f
passengers filled airport terminals nationwide, forcing airlines to offer more flights.
Newer, larger, and faster aircraft transported a m ore affluent traveling public to
destinations in half the time that it usually took by automobile, bus, or train. By the
1970s, thousands o f tourists boarded flights to cities throughout the coimtry, especially to
resort m eccas like Miami Beach, Orlando, Honolulu, and Las Vegas, which also
benefited from this trend. In 1948, four airlines (Bonanza, Western A ir Express, TWA,
and United) transported 35,106 passengers to Las Vegas. Eleven years later, that number
increased to a staggering 959,603." Then in the 1960s, thanks to the Simbelt boom,
credit cards, and the democratization o f casino gambling, Americans began flocking to
the “resort city o f lights” in the desert.
Before tourism became the cornerstone o f southern Nevada’s economy. Las
Vegas had been a small, western railroad town periodically convulsed by labor unrest. In
1922 for instance, a Union Pacific strike paralyzed the city’s economy. It suffered a
second blow when vengeful railroad executives m oved the town’s repair yards and their
valuable payrolls to Caliente in the mid-l920s.^ In 1929, the comm unity revived from
nearly a decade o f recession when the federal government funded construction o f
Boulder Dam, a massive public worics project that transformed Las Vegas from a desert
whistlestop to a vibrant tourist center.
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While America suffered in the early 1930s, southern Nevada boomed. In 1931,
construction o f Hoover Dam began and the project eventually required over 5.000
employees who, with their families, temporarily contributed to southern Nevada’s
growing economy. The dam also attracted thousands o f tourists who cam e from various
regions o f the country to wimess this massive undertaking. It continued to boost local
coffers until 1935, when construction ended, and many o f the workers left town. While
tourists still flocked to the site by the thousands to see this man-made wonder. Las Vegas
businessmen and other promoters struggled to boost tourism to offset the loss o f
population. They tried golf toiunaments, boat races on newly-formed Lake Mead, and
even invented the annual Helldorado Rodeo. But, it became increasingly obvious in the
late 1930s that gambling was the answer.
In 1931, the state legislature had voted to re-legalize the pastime. Until the late
1930s when California operators like G uy McAfee came to town, the casinos were
mostly small operations run by local hoteliers. But, the industry grew during World W ar
II when thousands o f soldiers and defense workers flocked to Las Vegas to try their luck.
The 1940s also wimessed the birth o f the Strip with the opening o f the El Rancho Vegas
in 1941 and the Hotel Last Frontier a year later. By war’s end, Busgy Siegel was
finishing the Fabulous Flamingo, with its luxurious carpeting, lavish chandeliers,
spacious rooms, and prem ier entertainment. The Thimderbird, and later in the 1950s, the
Desert Inn, Sands, Sahara, and myriad other resorts appeared to pose an increasing threat
to Fremont Street in the battle for the nation’s growing number o f toiuists. As the casino
city’s appeal grew, so did the popularity o f air travel, and the two eventually forged a
symbiotic relationship that was profitable to both industries.
Prior to the 1950s, transportation played a key role in feeding tourists to these
establishments. The automobile, bus, and train were the most popular conveyances
delivering people to Las Vegas. Angelenos drove or rode 300 miles through the Mojave
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Desert heat to experience the unique gambler’s paradise in Las Vegas. But, in the 1950s
and 1960s, as airlines began offering affordable fares and flew spacious, air-conditioned
aircraft, thousands o f tourists switched to air travel. By the 1980s and 1990s, as mega
resorts sprouted along the Strip, and gambling gained national and international
popularity, and as increasingly affluent Americans traveled more frequently than ever
before, air travel surpassed all other modes o f transportation except for the automobile.
This thesis explores the development o f air travel and tourism in Las Vegas from
1959 to the beginning o f the twenty-first century. In particular, it will focus on the close
relationship between the casino industry and airlines. Chapter 1 traces the development
o f McCarran International Airport, and describes its role in uniting commercial air travel
and tourism during the 1950s, 1960s, and in later decades. Chapter 2 emphasizes the
importance o f charters and junket airlines as air carriers that brought a new class o f
tourists to Las Vegas in the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This trend also provided an
opportunity for some hotels to develop a profitable addition to their resort operations.
The third chapter focuses on the central role played by A m erica's major commercial
airlines as vital transportation institutions which by the 1970s, began annually delivering
millions o f tourists to Las Vegas. Finally, chapter four examines the explosion o f the
city’s tourist industry in the 1980s and especially the 1990s, and how McCarran Airport
and the airlines adjusted to this growth, while at the same time, promoting it.
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Notes

*Ellis L. Annstrong, Suellen M . Hoy and M ichael C Robinson eds., “Airways and
Airports,” H istory o f P ublic W orks in the U nited States 1776-1976 (Chicago: American
Public W orks Association, 1976), 187-216,190. For m ore on airports in m ajor cities see
Stanley Cohen “Dallas/Ft. Worth to Open W orld’s Largest Airport this Month,”
C onsulting E ngineer A \ (September 1973), 72-81, and A dele Schwartz “Airports Patterns o f Progress: Dallas/Ft. Worth” A irline M anagem ent (April 1973), 30-31. For
m ore on airlines see Arnold Briddon, Ellmore Champie, and Peter M arraine eds. FAA
H isto rica l F act Book: A C hronology. 1926-197f W ashington D C , 1974, and Henry
Ladd Sm ith’s Airw ays: The H istory o f C om m ercial A viation in the U nited States., New
Yoric, 1942. Also see Donald W hitnah Safer Sl^mvays: F ederal C ontrol o f A viation.
1926-1966 (Ames, Iowa), 1966.
^Las Vegas Sun. March 5, 1960,5.
^Eugene P. Moehring, R esort C ity in the Sunbelt (Reno: University o f Nevada Press,
2000 ), 10.
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INTRODUCTION
THE EARLY YEARS
The roots o f aviation in Las Vegas lie deep in the city’s past. Less than two
decades after the Wright Brothers’ inaugural flight, local residents discussed the
possibility o f building an airport to supplement their train station and the approaching
highway from San Bernardino. On Thanksgiving Day, 1920, local resident Robert
Hausler (a former army pilot) opened Anderson Field (the field was on the Anderson
family’s property) soon after the first recorded plane landed in town.' Anderson Field
lay just three miles south o f Las Vegas, and consisted o f one graded dirt landing strip,
and a water tank (today located approximately in the Sahara and Las Vegas Hilton
parking lots)." This primitive airport had been used by local and military pilots until
1926, when Western Air Express began scheduled passenger service to Las Vegas.
Events moved quickly once brothers Leon and Earl Rockwell purchased the field
from Hausler in April, 1926 (renaming it Rockwell Field). Just one month after the deal,
the first W estern Air Express Douglas M-2 mail carrier landed there. The airline’s
founder, Harris M. “Pop” Hanshue, a former automobile dealer in Los Angeles, had
created the company in 1925 to exploit a lucrative federal government airmail contract
(Civil Air Mail Route #4) transporting mail from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City with Las
Vegas as a fuel stop.^ The city’s location was ideal, because it enjoyed favorable weather
and provided a safe place for an airstrip where pilots could takeoff and land. Though
Western A ir Express primarily flew mail, it was not long before the company began
carrying passengers. On M ay 23, 1926, Ben Redman and J.A. Thompson were the
first passengers to fly on the airline.^
6
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W hile city residents welcomed the Rockwells’ airport in 1926, finding private
funds to upgrade and maintain it became increasingly difficult. In 1928, the brothers
leased the field to the city for one year, and after the lease expired, they sold the airport.®
Coincidentally at that time in 1928, P A . “Pop” Simon, a local businessman, had been
developing an airport eight miles northeast o f Las Vegas as a base for Nevada A ir Lines,
which promised to offer daily flights between Las Vegas and Reno. But the deal
collapsed, leaving Simon with an airport and a few general aviation tenants.^
W hile searching for a new airport, Hanshue decided it would be more economical
for his airline to operate out o f a company-owned field than to rent private facilities.
Thus, he struck a deal with Simon in Novem ber 1929, agreeing to lease the airfield for 20
years. By 1932, Rockwell Field had become an insignificant small facility for general
aviation pilots while Western Air Express Field emerged as the city’s main airport.^
Vem Willis, a ticket agent and station manager for the airline in 1940,
remembered that the facility had a terminal “that was 20 feet by 40 feet, containing a
coffee shop, some small offices, a radio room, a ticket counter, and a weather station in
an adjoining building with a water tower on its roof.”^ It also contained eight or nine slot
machines that often brought in more revenue than airline ticket sales. In fact, the
term inal’s gambling revenues were so high that airline personnel “had to empty them
three or four times a day.”’ With Western A ir Express offering four daily flights between
Los Angeles and Salt Lake City, and with other commercial airlines entering the market,
and flying larger aircraft such as DC-3s and Constellations, airport expansion became
critical. In the late 1930s, the ciw, with financial support from Roosevelt’s N ew Deal,
tried to buy the facility, but Western Air Express blocked the deal.'®
A few years later, war accomplished what negotiators failed. Following the
outbreak o f war in Europe, the United States army had been searching for a gunnery field
to train its pilots for the war. On October 5, 1940, the city o f Las Vegas agreed to lease
the field to the Army A ir Corps, resulting in an airport for joint military/civilian use. On
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January 25,1941, the A ir Corps signed a lease extension and received $340,000 firom the
Civil Aeronautics Board for improvements that included one 4,000 foot-long, east-west
runway, a 5,900 foot-long, north-south runway, as well as a third landing strip, grading,
drainage, and hangars."
The town also gained another field during the war. In 1942, George Crockett, an
aviation enthusiast from Unionsville, Missouri, arrived in town seeking land for a dirt
airstrip, his flight school, and air tour business he intended to open. Crockett expressed
interest in purchasing Western A ir Express Field, but quickly changed his mind when he
discovered that it cost $500 per acre. He leased 640 acres south o f town o ff the Los
Angeles Highway (today the Strip) from the Department o f Interior at a rate o f $10 a year
for 20 years. Because the government offered lucrative contracts to flight schools to train
pilots for the war, Crockett leased $35,000 worth o f machinery including eight airplanes,
aircraft tools, and other equipment from Sioux Skyways, a commercial air carrier (going
out o f business) in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. But in order to receive a Civilian Pilot
Training (CPT) contract from the government, he needed a hangar. Because he did not
have enough money to pay for a hangar, he had to sell three airplanes and borrow
$4,500.'Crockett literally built his airport from scratch. He spent days grading the
airport’s gravel nmways and struck a deal with a contractor and purchased an old
construction shack for $1,800, in addition to three adobe walls and second-hand lumber
for building a terminal and hangar. He also had a well filled with water, but nothing to
use as a pump until he acquired an old diesel engine for $1,200 to pump running water.
Also, a gas company gave him an old Texaco truck to be used for fueling airplanes.'®
On January 1, 1943, he inaugurated Alamo Field, an airport consisting o f three runways,
a terminal building, flight school, rental car business (U-Drive it cars), a motel (the
Beacon Inn), and a complimentary shuttle service to town for pilots.'^ Despite
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Crockett’s intention o f building a facility for primarily general aviation, the field quickly
became one that would serve all commercial airlines.
In 1946, the army closed its training base and ended its partnership w ith Clark
County. But, in 1947, as the Cold War escalated, the newly-created United States A ir
Force, with the support o f Senator Pat McCarran, aimounced its intention o f establishing
a permanent base at the old site. The stumbling block o f course, was the need to share
runways with commercial flights. Following a series o f discussions with Pentagon
officials and McCarran, local and political business leaders decided that air force payrolls
and supply orders dictated that the county build its own public airport. Clearly, the
airlines supported this move. Throughout the war. Western Airlines (W estern A ir
Express became W estern Airlines in March 1941 just one month after W estern Air
Express Field was renamed McCarran Field), TWA, Bonanza, and United had
complained about how military traffic gave them little space to operate. So, to please
both the air force and commercial carriers, the Clark County Board o f Commissioners, in
consulting with the City Commissioners, entered into agreement with Crockett to
purchase his airport for S I23,000.'® In addition to the sale, the county also included in
the contract, a thirty year lease for him to remain on the field as a fixed base operator.
After completion o f the deal in 1948, all commercial airlines relocated to Alamo Field
while the air force continued operating out o f its base, which, in 1951, was re-named
Nellis Air Force Base. To be sure, preparing Alamo Field for commercial operations was
expensive. In addition to $850,000 in federal airport funds to help finance the $1.5
million needed for the project, the county proposed a $750,000 bond issue.'® Despite
opposition fi'om some local residents, the bond issue passed. On December 19, 1948, the
county renamed Alamo Field for Senator Pat McCarran, who had not only helped to
secure this facility, but also the original army gunnery base, and the Basic Magnesium
defense factory in what became Henderson.'^
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From the outset, the new airport was clearly inadequate for the increasing
passenger volume and air traffic in Las Vegas. Only a year after its opening, commercial
airlines carried 42,724 passengers, a number far exceeding what the relatively small
facility could handle.'* Even though the airport possessed three paved runways that were
night lit, an air traffic control tower, and a weather station, it was simply too small for the
number and size o f aircraft operating there daily. As more hotel construction boosted air
travel, pressure mounted on airport officials to expand their facility. As the Sands,
Sahara, and other plush resorts appeared on the Strip in the 1950s, passenger volume
continued to soar at McCarran. In fact, by 1955, nearly half a million passengers walked
through the airport’s gates, forcing airport manager John Metten and his planning staff to
draw up plans for expanded runways, taxi ways, and terminal facilities. By 1959, the
crunch was so great that Metten and county officials decided that their only recourse was
to build a new and much larger public airport o ff Paradise Road.
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CHAPTER I

A NEW AIRPORT IS BORN

In the late 1950s, increased air traffic and terminal congestion caused by tourist
growth in Las Vegas left airport officials with few options. The county had already spent
well over one m illion dollars grading and paving ramps, repairing runways and taxiways,
and combating passenger congestion. Over $600,000 had been spent on runway
extension and lighting alone. By the end o f 1959, the airport handled 959,603 passengers
and 99 flights per day.' These figures led County Commissioner Clesse Turner to
conclude that “the combination o f lack o f space to accommodate je ts and a bad airport
location, made it prohibitive to enlarge the present [terminal] building.”^ R eview -Joum al
editor A1 Cahlan pointed out the need for a new facility by claim ing that “the present
facilities are completely unfit for the class o f people we are getting to come to Las Vegas
and the increasing num ber o f airlines serving this community have brought obsolescence
so far as accommodations are concerned.”® Passenger growth was sim ply overwhelming.
Cahlan argued that “since the airport was constructed, air travel into Las Vegas has
mushroomed to a point where, this year, it is probable that traffic w ill reach the one
m illion per year mark.” Expansion was thus essential to Las V egas’ future.^ He pointed
out that “in the next ten years, practically every m ajor airline will have changed over to
jets. .. The feeder lines, will have to convert to som e sort o f turboprops.... When that time
comes, a ir traffic will soar tremendously. ”® His prediction was correct.
In 1959, the introduction o f jet aircraft completely transform ed the air travel
industry and forced Claric County to build a larger facility. For three decades prior to the
12
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1959 delivery o f the Boeing 720B, 707, and the Douglas DC-8 to airlines, passengers had
to travel on slow, noisy, propeller-driven aircraft® Although these airplanes were
certainly faster than automobiles, trains, or boats, they still took hours, with all the fuel
stops, to deliver passengers to their destinations. The turbojet shortened travel time and
allowed passengers to extend their vacations. Anthony Sampson, author o f E m pires o f
the Shy: P olitics, C ontests, and C artels o f W orld A irlines, explained how “the je t
transformed the entire economics and sociology o f air transportation, making travel not
only faster, but more reliable and cheaper, opening it up to a mass market.”^ Obviously,
airlines and casino executives could hardly wait for the arrival o f these planes.
Airport managers, however, were not as enthusiastic. McCarran Airport Director
Gordon Miles remembered when the United Airlines Boeing 720B first landed at the
airport in February 1960. Company officials invited Miles onboard for a tour o f the
plane’s spacious and luxurious interior and took him on a brief flight over part o f the
Grand Canyon. He recalled how it turned out to be a “bit o f a circus,” because McCarran
Airport had not yet been equipped to accommodate such a large and heavy aircraft*
With more jets forecast to serve Las Vegas, the airport had to reinforce runway pavement
(for weight), and extend runway lengths because jets needed longer takeoff distances,
especially on hot afternoons due to reduced engine output and lift. The airport also had
to widen taxiways, expand terminal space, and enlarge the gates. In August 1960, United
advertised “first class and custom coach” non-stop je t service from New York and
(Chicago to Las Vegas.”’ But the new planes did not alleviate M cCarran’s air traffic and
terminal congestion problems; they only added to them. Still, the advent o f je t service in
1960 increased community support for airport expansion and the bond issue.
According to new airport plans, the dome-shaped facility, when finished, would
consist o f two-two story buildings. The first would contain airline ticket counters,
offices, and baggage carousels. The second, a 90,000 square foot hexagonal-shaped
satellite structure, w ould house a restaurant, cocktail lounge, shops, a nursery.
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concessions, and 16 gates for jet aircraft with provisions for enlargement to
accommodate 24 aircraft” '® The ground floor o f both buildings would contain airline
sales counters, a baggage claim area, car rental counters, a newsstand, and a barbershop.
As an added feature for passengers and taxi and bus drivers, a large canopy provided
shade by covering the front entrance o f the main term inal." Airport planners and
developers also wanted to build an air traffic control tower with the most advanced radio,
radar, and tele communications equipment, a fire station at the base o f the tower, and a
parking structure with 1,400 automobile spaces.'® To implement these plans, airport
planners and officials asked voters to pass a crucial SS m illion bond issue for airport
expansion.
Initially, the bond issue had few supporters. Boosters were concerned that voters
would not approve it because a $6 million issue for local schools had already been
passed, and the likelihood o f voters approving the allocation o f more taxpayer dollars for
airport expansion was doubtful. Airport manager Gordon M iles even noted the
opposition o f many resort casino executives to the move, because “when the airport was
on the west side, all hotels felt that they had a decent shot at the tourists. .. W ith the new
location, some o f the operators felt that the traffic would be diverted away from their
hotels.” '® In fact, some casino owners on the south end o f the Strip demanded that the
county pave Bond Road (today Tropicana Avenue) from the airport directly to their part
o f the Strip. One concemed hotel owner even argued that “any move that would divert
traffic fix)m [our end o f the] Strip would certainly be detrimental to our entire
economy.” ''*
On the eve o f the vote, these casino owners held a m eeting to discuss how to
pressure the county into building Bond Road. County engineers responded that
construction o f such a road would be useless because the Strip was already overcrowded
and a new road would only add to the congestion. Coimty Commission Chairman Harley
Harmon, a Las Vegas resident him self contended that appropriating $50,000 for a one
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w ay highway out o f airport parking connecting to the south end o f the Strip was a waste
o f money. Having realized that the county rejected their argument, the casino owners
backed away. But in the early 1960s, after much political maneuvering, they received
their road.
The casino owners were not the only ones who expressed opposition to the
proposed new airport. Some local residents vociferously objected to the entire project,
calling it “a white elephant basking in the sun.” '® However, despite opposition from
som e tax-weary residents and many casino executives, on March 17, 1960, the bond issue
passed.
Voters’ approval for construction o f the new airport could not have come at a
better time. McCarran officials knew that after consolidating all o f the commercial
airlines at Alamo Field, the annual passenger volume would skyrocket, and thus fuel the
need for further expansion. Just a few days before voters voted on the bond issue, the
Las Vegas Chamber o f Commerce overwhelmingly supported the measure by a vote o f
12 to 1 (the one who voted against the measure owned a hotel). One member justified his
vote for expansion by claiming that ’th e increase o f Las Vegas air travel is dependent on
the construction o f a new terminal building and other improvements at M cCarran
Field.” '® Another argued that expansion was vital t o keep up with the je t age o f
transportation.” ' ®
Even County Commissioners were convinced that they m ade the right decision by
moving the airport to Paradise Road. Despite the expense, they knew that Las Vegas
needed a new facility to accommodate mushrooming tourists and je t aircraft. The new
M cCarran would do that. According to chief architect John Replogle o f W elton, Becket
& Associates, “the new McCarran facilities have been designed for the convenience o f
the jet-age air traveler.... We have tried to provide [him] as efficient service on the
ground as he usually receives in the air.” '*
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The m ajor problem that county commissioners faced was the cost, especially in a
city and state where taxpayers were known for their parsimony. Everyone knew that
construction o f the new airport and improvements to the old one would be expensive. In
a 1957 airport study, airport planning and developer Leigh Fisher & Associates had
estimated that a new facility would cost $3,865,000. Further expansion o f the existing
facility, they claimed, would easily exceed $2.5 million.” The study even warned that
•'expansion o f existing facilities would be limited by space at the current site.”®® Alamo
Field would gain 12 gates, however, there would be no additional room for further
expansion.
After voters approved the crucial bond issue, construction began immediately.
Contractors lengthened runways, widened taxiways, and enlarged the terminal for general
aviation and charter aircraft (this was for McCarran Airport located at the old Alamo
Field). They also built a new jetport, runways, taxiways, and a ramp at the new location
(today Paradise Road and Russell Road) only for commercial airline use. The new
McCarran Airport opened on March 15, 1963.
When workers completed construction o f the latter, the cost was far more than
they originally projected, $4.5 million (not including the cost o f improvements at the old
airport).®' The airport also had to purchase $1.25 million worth o f land for future
development.®® County Commissioner Harley Harmon informed residents that federal
airport funding would pay for a majority o f the expense but the rest had to be borne by
the taxpayers.
In its first year, the new airport handled over 1.5 million passengers and averaged
128 flights a day. Six airlines served McCarran including Pacific Airlines and Delta. In
1967, the passenger volume doubled, and more je t aircraft appeared at the gates. After
four years o f operation. Las Vegas was booming. Caesars Palace opened in 1966, and
Kirk Kerkorian’s plans for the enormous International Hotel (later the Las Vegas Hilton)
promised to inundate the Strip with even more visitors. So, after only four years o f
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operation, M cCarran was already inadequate. As a result. Airport Manager Earl Taylor
(who replaced Gordon Miles in 1965), and his staff began planning for further expansion.
Their plan called for doubling the size o f the terminals, lengthening the runways,
widening the taxiways, and adding 36 more gates.®^
In 1968, the Boeing 727’s arrival demonstrated why the airport had to be
expanded. With a seating capacity for 155 people (far more than the maximum capacity
o f any propeller driven aircraft) and a gross landing weight o f 188,000 pounds, it became
the m ost popular commercial jet (replacing many smaller aircraft) at McCarran. By
decade’s end, wide-bodies made their appearance in Las Vegas. In 1969, a Boeing 747
test airplane landed at the airport, inaugurating the arrival o f still another je t age.
Completion o f the expansion project in 1974 (which began in 1968) carried with
it a hefty price tag o f $30 million. This time, county commissioners found a new funding
source to avoid antagonizing local residents every time the airport needed addition
facilities. Bonds were sold that cost the taxpayers nothing. As early as 1966, the airport
was finally able to pay for its own expenses, because it made a tremendous profit by
leasing the gates, ticket counters, and baggage carousels to commercial airlines, as well
as terminal space to concessions (slot machines also brought in significant revenue).
This was essential because the metropolitan area’s population base was still relatively
small at that time (about 100,000 people), making it difficult for the county to rely on
taxpayers as an additional source o f funding for expensive airport projects. The airport
had to support itself, and it largely did.
But, as the passenger volume continued to soar, it quickly became clear that even
the $30 m illion expansion project was inadequate. Residents and journalists criticized
the new airport for still being too small. They argued that increased airport air traffic
would only contribute further to the terminal congestion. They were right. W ith the
passenger volume expected to easily reach ten million by 1980, Taylor and his staff hired
Landrum & Brown (in 1972), a consulting firm to design plans to alleviate M cCarran’s
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traffic problem for the next two decades. In its 1976 executive summary, the firm urged
the airport to immediately purchase 3,000 more acres o f land for further runway
extension, more taxiways, and a strengthened apron for heavy jets (at the new airport). It
also recommended that the airport acquire additional property for construction o f a new
terminal, runways, and taxiways for general aviation and charter operators (at the old
airport).-^
In 1976, Taylor hired TRA, another airport consulting company, to conduct a
study. In its 1979 executive summary, the firm recommended construction o f a third
runway at the new airport, terminal expansion to include three satellites, and a people m over system.'^ Planners for TRA and Landrum & Brown clearly recognized the need
for immediate expansion. As one report asserted, “the terminal building is now burdened
with more passengers and airplanes than it can comfortably accommodate ... Every part
o f the facility is overcrowded, from ticketing and baggage areas to coffee shops and
restrooms.”*^ Both studies also predicted that by 1995, “passenger loads would exceed
30 million and the number o f commercial aircraft seeking to use the airfield would more
than double.’*"^ TRA won the contract and began construction in 1980.
After protracted discussion, the county commissioners voted in 1979 to begin
work in 1980 on “McCarran 2000,” a multi-phase process designed to equip Las Vegas
with a large enough airport to handle 20 million tourists by the end o f the century. Phase
I o f the new “McCarran 2000” masterplan called for the construction o f a new parking
facility, an automated transit system for passengers, a new crash/fire/rescue building, a
new air traffic control tower, and upgraded facilities. Phases two and three included
terminal expansion, still more gates, another parking garage, new taxiways, satellite
buildings for international arrivals, and lengthened runways, as well as a third runway.^*
Obtaining funds for this enormous project was not easy. Completion o f the first
phase cost a staggering $278 million. As a result, airport management and county
officials struggled to sell enough bonds to cover the cost. But they had, because the
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projects were essential to modernizing the facility . For example, since the airport utilities
were antiquated and operated well beyond their capacity, officials had to build a new
tunnel for the facility’s expanded infrastructure. John Solomon, McCarran Airport
Aviation Director, explained how it took several years for contractors to "construct a new
tunnel to access power lines for heating and cooling systems, a water system, sewer and
gas lines, as well as communication lines.”^’ Though work was supposed to begin in
1982, the results o f the 1978 federal deregulation o f the airline industry brought so many
new carriers to Las Vegas so quickly, that it forced the airport to start sooner.
Deregulation brought added traffic, despite the drag created by N ew Jersey’s
legalization o f gaming in Atlantic City in that same year. In 1980, Las Vegas’ passenger
volume exceeded ten million. Airport expansion continued and in 1985, the airport
completed Phase I. Robert Broadbent replaced Solomon as Airport Director in the
following year, and oversaw the commencement and completion o f Phase II. By 1990,
the “C’*gates had been built to help accommodate Southwest Airlines’ rapid expansion
o f service. Plans immediately went forward to implement Phase III, which included “D”
gates (completed two years ahead o f schedule in 1998. adding 28 more gates), more
parking (a $77 million, nine story structure), a second air terminal for international and
charter flights (a $35 million, 183.000 square-foot facility with eight gates), and new
executive terminals for Signature Flight Support. Eagle Canyon Airlines, and other
corporate and air tour operators. Ambitious officials also planned to extend the three
existing runways, and construction o f a fourth with a full instrument approach and
lighting system (built in 1991, costing the airport $81 million)
W ork was completed on these projects just in time, because over 33 million
people passed through McCarran International Airport before century’s end. And
forecasters see the num ber surging higher as Las Vegas surpasses Mecca, the world’s
leading tourist destination. Indeed, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority
expects that num ber to increase to 55 million by 2012. By that time, the airport’s 98
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gates will be unable to accommodate the proposed increase in air traffic. According to
planners, realistically, 120 to 125 are needed.^'
As the twenty-first century dawned, McCarran International Airport had become
the vital link between commercial air travel and tourism in Las Vegas. It provided the
necessary means to ensure a continuous flow o f vacationers coming to the city. Because
the passenger volume rose —at times almost exponentially between the 1940s and the
1990s —airport expansion became crucial to the city’s future economy. As early as
1979, the study by TRA pointed out how “air traffic in Clark County multiplied at a far
greater rate than the national average... This traffic represents economic vitality to the
Las Vegas community... and it will be to the advantage o f the entire county to cultivate
and facilitate the increase.”^" Therefore, as tourism continued to grow, McCarran
International Airport played a greater role in an era when commercial air travel finally
became the preferred means o f transportation for many Americans.
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CHAPTER 2

FIRST CLASS JUNKET AIRLINES
FOR COACH CLASS TRAVELERS

When we think o f tourists flying to Las Vegas, Reno, and other casino cities
today, we normally think o f passengers deplaning o ff a regularly scheduled flight which
they booked for the standard fare offered by American, Delta, o r some other commercial
airline for that destination. But there is another side to the air transport business, which
for over forty years has played a significant role in the gambling business. As early as
1959, the Las Vegas Chamber o f Commerce reported that 151,173 passengers who flew
to Las Vegas arrived on charters or private flights.^
These so-called “junkets” not only contributed significantly to volume in the
passenger transportation industry, but also represented a new madceting niche for the
hotel business. No other junket airline in Nevada epitomized this more than Warren
“Doc” Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines, which he began in 1959 to feed tourists and gamblers
to his Hacienda Hotel. W ith eight airplanes flying between Las Vegas and destinations
in California, New Yoric, and Hawaii, and scores o f people w aiting to make reservations
on the inexpensive flights. Hacienda Airlines quickly became the most successful junket
carrier in Nevada.
Traditionally, junket deals were only available to high rollers. Gambling resorts
showed little interest in offering these packages to the lower ends o f the market. As M ark
Skidmore pointed out in his study o f the industry, “each junketeer was a male over the

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

age o f 21, w oddng in a profession where he earned an annual salary exceeding
$30,000.”^ Skidmore also noted an additional prerequisite; each junketeer had to
establish a minimum $2500 line o f credit with the casino. In return they received a
complimentary hotel room, meals, beverages, and a show ticket. In B ig Ju lie o f Vegas,
author Edward Liim provides a similar description o f a junket in the section where he
described a group o f doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, who flew from New York
to Las Vegas on a chartered United Airlines DC-8. At the casino, each o f them spent
hundreds o f dollars and in return, received coupons for complimentary beverages, a
buffet, and show tickets.^ Though Skidmore and Linn argue that junkets only catered to
wealthy customers, the two authors were unaware that a junket airline market for
moderate and lower income travelers had already been established.
Before Hacienda Airlines even began, other junket carriers had been flying people
to Las Vegas for almost twenty years. These junkets were popular and contributed a
hefty increment to hotel profits, hi 1942, the Hotel Last Frontier bussed m any o f its
customers to town, but it shifted to airplanes in the following year because highway
travel was too slow. By contracting with various air charter services in Los Angeles, the
hotel was able to transport more people daily. William J. M oore, general manager and
co-owner o f the Last Frontier, negotiated an arrangement with these carriers that allowed
him to offer his guests a package deal “at a very reduced price” that included a room, a
number o f meals, and transportation to and from the airport. Customers arrived in Los
Angeles from Detroit or Dallas on commercial airlines, and then boarded a charter plane
operated by a local air charter service to Las Vegas.^ In a reminiscence, Moore claimed
that the Last Frontier pioneered charter airplane promotions, and created a new niche in
the Las Vegas travel market that “attracted a lot o f people” to town.^
O ne o f the air services in Southern California with which the Last Frontier
contracted was Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS), owned and operated by a young
entrepreneur nam ed Kirk Kerkorian. His fleet consisted o f a Douglas DC-3, a twin-
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engine Cessna, and a single engine Beechcraft.^ Though the LAAS flew people from Los
Angeles Municipal Aiiport to many different destinations on the West Coast, the most
conunon was Las Vegas, where Kerkorian also did a lot o f business with Moore. In
1950, Kerkorian m oved his operation to the Lockheed A ir Terminal in Long Beach,
where he competed with forty other junket airlines. He struggled for a while until he
pleased his customers by upgrading his service by purchasing a four-engine Douglas C54. After spending $28,000 to retrofit it and refurbish the interior, Kerkorian’s flights
were always full.^ As a result, he quickly became a contender with the other junket
airlines, and in the process learned a lot about the casino city he would someday help
transform.
Despite his success, young Kerkorian never matched the success that Warren
Bayley enjoyed with Hacienda Airlines. This carrier began in 1959 when Henry Price,
who already was a hotel promotions staff member and owner o f an air charter service in
Burbank, asked Bayley if he would be interested in flying moderate and low income
Southern California gamblers and tourists to the Hacienda. Price explained that he
operated weekly flights to the Showboat and Thunderbird hotels where managers
complained about not having enough available rooms to accommodate weekend crowds.
Bayley immediately accepted Price’s offer on condition that Price would provide flights
on weekdays and weekends. Hacienda Hotel Manager Richard Taylor recalled Bayley
saying that “if 32 people in Los Angeles are willing to fly to Las Vegas on a weekend,
then there certainly m ust be 32 more willing to come on a weekday.”'
Bayley’s intuition proved correct. In 1959, he launched the resort’s Hacienda
Flight Division with a fleet o f two DC-3s, each capable o f seating 32 passengers, one
DC-4 for 77 passengers, and five Constellations that seated 80 passengers each.
According to Taylor, Bayley’s flights were so popular that customers had to book their
reservation three or four weeks in advance.’
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A t the time when Bayley began his operation, the Dunes Hotel, his major
competitor, had been providing daily junket flights for several years from Los Angeles,
Long Beach, and Burbank with a single DC-3. One $24.95 ticket entitled a guest to a
tour o f the luxurious palace resort, lounge entertaimnent, show tickets, cocktails, a buffet
dinner, a bottle o f the Dunes Gold Label Champagne, and free limousine service.
Tourists wanting a room paid $8 more per night on weekdays, and $ 13 more during
weekends and holidays." The existing Dimes model was important, because it
convinced Bayley that operating his own airline was feasible.
Once Bayley’s service began, he wasted little tim e in appointing Henry Price as
manager o f Hacienda’s flight division to oversee flight operations. Like the Dunes,
Bayley began with one airplane when he leased a DC-3. Increasing passenger traffic
soon convinced Price to urge Bayley to buy a larger airplane and abandon leasing.
Bayley purchased a DC-4, and spent $95,000 to completely refurbish it with comfortable
seats and a piano bar.' ' He even provided entertainment en route. Bayley hired Dick
Winslow, a former Hollywood actor, as his in-flight entertainer. W inslow, who played
tunes and sang popular songs during the flights, conceded that his music was secondary
to his primary responsibility; calming nervous passengers who had never flown before - a common problem in the 1960s." Other “shows” on these flights included young,
attractive women modeling fashions for the passengers. Contrary to rumor and claims in
the G reen F elt Jungle that these ladies performed a striptease, they actually never did,
although they wore lingerie that was risqué for the tim e."
For $27.50, a Hacienda Airlines passenger received $5 in chips, a buffet dinner, a
bottle o f champagne, membership to a golf course lit at night (where each guest had a
chance to w in $5,000 for a hole-in-one), a ticket for the show at the N ew Frontier (a
resort which Bayley had earlier purchased a 90 percent share), and limousine service.
Guests also received a tote bag with the Hacienda logo as a souvenir o f their experience.
W hile at the hotel, guests also enjoyed complimentary glasses o f champagne. If a guest
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wanted to stay overnight, they paid $35.50; weekend packages cost $9 m o re." Those
traveling on long-distance flights could stay five or six days with the same amenities for
$188.50."
Bayley offered low fares, and he frequently advertised his airline in Los Angeles
newspapers and on highway billboards. His innovative management team even came up
with the idea o f printing flight schedules on the inside o f matchbook covers that were
dispensed from cigarette vending machines all across the West. This gimmick was an
ingenious promotion tactic. Thanks to innovative advertising, Bayley’s carrier booked
thousands o f gamblers into Las V egas."
The resort’s flight schedule and range o f destinations was impressive. Hacienda
Airlines offered daily flights from Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Ana, Burbank, San
Francisco, and San Diego to Las Vegas using DC-3s and Constellations. Longer-range
flights from Dallas, St. Louis, Chicago, New York, Detroit, and Honolulu required use o f
Bayley’s DC-4 and Constellations. In a 2000 interview, Boyd Michael, Hacienda C hief
Pilot and Director o f Pilot Training, outlined a typical weekly crew schedule to
demonstrate the size o f Bayley’s operation and ominously, how it competed with the
m ajor airlines in many o f the same cities. He recalled that on a Friday afternoon a DC-4
crew would leave Burbank Airport for Las Vegas, continue to St. Louis, and terminate in
Chicago. The crew had a layover on Saturday, and then on Sunday would leave with a
partial load from Chicago to St. Louis, where they would load more passengers before
heading to Las Vegas for even more passengers before terminating in Honolulu. For the
DC-3 junket flights, a crew would leave Long Beach Airport and fly to Los Angeles, then
Burbank before landing in Las Vegas. Constellation crews flew primarily from Las
Vegas to St. Louis, Detroit, Chicago, N ew York, Dallas, and Honolulu. The airline also
operated flights from San Francisco to Las Vegas twice weekly. According to Michael, a
DC-3 crew flew five roundtrips per day between San Francisco and Las Vegas. By 1961,
Hacienda Airlines ran seventy flights a w e ek ."
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Bayley soon found him self the owner o f a sizable airline. In 1962, the appraised
value o f his fleet was between SI and $2 m illion." Earlier, in 1961, Bayley had
purchased 25 additional Constellations from TWA. The transaction also included thirtyeight extra engines, twenty-five extra propellers, and S3.5 m illion worth o f spare parts
and tools. At that time, it was the largest purchase by any air service operator in Nevada
history and would have put the value o f his fleet much higher." But because o f growing
financial difficulties related to problems with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), he
never took delivery o f those Constellations. Had he done so, his fleet would have
exceeded 30 airplanes and his service would have more than tripled the capacity o f the
hotel’s guest capability. In addition to purchasing these planes, Bayley paid S35 million
for six jets including a Boeing 707 from TWA. One Convair 880 and the Boeing 707
were scheduled for delivery in April 1962.“ He intended to use these aircraft for nonstop
service from Las Vegas to Honolulu, New York, (Zhicago, and Miami. But once again,
because o f Bayley’s problems with the CAB, these jets never appeared on the flight line.
Bayley’s only maintenance base for his aircraft was at Long Beach A ir Terminal
where a staff o f 62 mechanics tended to his fleet. He wanted to move his entire operation
to Las Vegas, but his fear o f prompting a lawsuit or complaint from the commercial
airlines discouraged him from doing so. Had Bayley moved to the casino city, his
reduced operating costs would have allowed him to fly even more passengers from
Southern California and the East to southern Nevada. The move also would have
pumped an estimated $520,000 into Southern Nevada’s economy annually from the
maintenance payroll alone, hi addition, Bayley would have contributed another $1.5
million in payrolls for his flight crews.^'
Despite its contribution to Las Vegas tourism and profitability. Hacienda Airlines
faced an uncertain future. In 1960, Hacienda Airlines delivered more than 70,000
passengers to M cCarran Airport with projections for 120,000 in 1961.“ The
success o f Bayley’s enterprise, however, spariced much growing resentment among the
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commercial airlines. His bargains drew so much traffic to his airline that it prompted
TWA, United, and other commercial airlines serving Las Vegas to file numerous
complaints with the CAB, accusing Bayley o f engaging in unfair competition. In 1960,
they filed a formal complaint with the CAB also claiming that Bayley’s airline was
operating without a certificate.^ United, TWA, and the others also filed a complaint in
1960 against the Dunes, which offered free flights in its DC-3. The complaint alleged
that the Dunes’ operation also lacked a certificate. In 1961, after CAB pressure, the
Dunes canceled its air service to avoid expensive litigation. Hacienda Airlines became
the next CAB target.
A year and a h alf after Bayley began his airline, on August 12, 1960, the CAB
issued an order to close it down. CAB examiner Richard W alsh’s investigation
concluded that Bayley’s carrier violated the Federal Aviation Act by operating “package
tours” without an operations certificate." Hacienda General M anager Richard Taylor
countered by arguing that the airline ’’provided air transportation fiee o f charge solely for
guests o f the Hacienda in Las Vegas and thus was not engaged in carrying passengers for
compensation or hire and did not need a certificate.”" Hacienda attorneys filed
numerous appeals and even obtained a federal injunction on M ay 5, 1961, which blocked
the CAB fiom enacting and enforcing its order. The court allowed the airline to operate
its long-range flights under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 42, which permitted ten
flights a m onth from any city in the United States to Las V eg as." This order decreased
the num ber o f the airline’s long-range flights, but still allowed it to continue normal
flights.
Hacienda Airlines executives and attorneys reemphasized to CAB officials that
their airline did not require a certificate because it was a charter service and not a
scheduled airline. However, the CAB insisted that because the carrier operated like a
commercial airline w ith a flight schedule and charged customers m oney for package
deals, it needed an operating certificate. So, after the agency rejected their argument.
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Hacienda attorneys filed a second application for a certificate (Bayley had filed a
previous application, which the CAB had not reviewed). Later, the lawyers conceded
that when the airline began in 1959, for a brief time, customers bought tickets, but once
the Hacienda offered package deals, passengers no longer had to buy tickets. They
essentially flew for fice. The package amount that they paid was equal to the value o f an
airplane ticket.
O f course, there was another powerful argument against the federal government
using its regulatory power to shut down this business. As Taylor observed, the Hacienda
generated a tremendous amount o f new business for Las Vegas - a point that the resort’s
attorneys and promoters emphasized. Taylor also stressed that the airlines showed
consistent increases in passenger volum e." Hacienda attorney John Preston Jr. asserted
that the operation was not “for hire” and was only a “business promotional
device.”" But, the commercial airlines’ opposition continued. On June 6, 1961,
Hacienda Airlines was forced to deplane and enplane its entire fleet at the Las Vegas
Airmotive Terminal (at the old McCarran Field) because o f complaints by Bonanza
Airlines that “the ramps were getting overcrowded for the commercial airlines
In the end, the CAB sided with the airlines. CAB attorney Robert Toomey again
argued that the Hacienda operated illegally without a certificate and cautioned that other
resorts would follow suit if allowed to do so. He asserted that an increase in competition
would be detrimental to the commercial airlines. Toomey recalled in 1960 how the CAB
“adopted its examiner’s findings that Las Vegas Hacienda hic., and Henry Price,
m anager o f Hacienda’s Flight Division had operated as a common carrier for
compensation between California and Las Vegas without CAB authority in violation o f
the Federal Aviation Act.”"
A s the CAB intensified its pressure on Bayley, his resort competitors did little to
support him. Despite the increased tourism that Bayley’s carrier awarded Las Vegas, the
other resorts in town overwhelmingly supported the CA B’s decision. One anonymous
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casino executive poignantly asked; “W hat incentive will the airlines have to boost Las
Vegas when we fly a minimum o f three thousand passengers a m onth for free?” He
further cautioned that “w e are also going to be in trouble if we couple booze with
gambling and gimmick-style promotions and toss in $S for lure.... That puts us in a class
o f ‘Sin City USA,’ an identification we have successfully avoided for five years.”^' The
Strip hotels opposed any changes affecting their traditional practice o f catering to opulent
customers. In fact, they even opposed new CAB-sanctioned competition.
As a result o f concerted pressure from commercial airline attorneys and growing
criticism from Strip hotels and local newspapers, lawyers for the CAB went to a
California Court of Appeals seeking an order to permanently shutdown Hacienda
Airlines. On January 17, 1962, they emerged victorious, but the Hacienda immediately
appealed to the California Supreme Court. Taylor predicted that his operation would
continue, because, as he put it, the courts would recognize “that the CAB was influenced
by m ajor airlines” and that Hacienda Airlines was not violating the la w ." However, on
May 21, 1962, the Supreme Court justices upheld the lower court’s decision and ruled
that “the Hacienda program, while different, still required a Certificate o f Convenience
and Necessity.”^^ On May 26, the Hacienda once again appealed to the court, but the
justices reaffirmed their decision and ordered the Hacienda to cease operations by July
10.
This represented a m ajor defeat for Bayley. In an address to company employees,
he reported that although it was the hotel’s position that Hacienda Airlines did not require
an operating certificate, an application for one had been filed by the hotel with the CAB
since 1960, but after two and a half years, it was still pending. He also expressed his
concern that the loss o f his airline could damage his resort’s business. “Unless we find
relief in some manner,” he warned, “the effect on the hotel will be unknown as we have
had flight customers from the beginning, and therefore have no yardstick by which to
measure business after our flights are curtailed.”"
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W hile one might expect that at least some Las Vegas resort owners would finally
unite around Bayley, this was not the case. Instead, they continued to support TWA,
American, and the other commercial airlines. Specifically, the resort community
criticized Bayley for targeting moderate and lower-income customers rather than high
rollers. Las Vegas hotel executives contended that wealthy people traditionally spent
more m oney gambling and were more representative o f the type o f image the resorts
should promote. This criticism echoed loudly in the local newspapers where columnists
such as Paul Price criticized Bayley for not catering to wealthy gamblers, and argued that
as a result o f these “free flights,” commercial airlines would lack incentive to expand
their fleets and markets and any new airlines serving Las Vegas would follow suit.^^
Price sharply criticized Bayley for blatantly disregarding the damaging effects that his
junket airline had on conunercial service by slowing its development and growth.
In retrospect, Taylor noted that as a result o f the widespread success o f Hacienda
Airlines and its parent hotel, few Strip resorts liked Bayley’s “new ideas” and pressured
him to shut down his airline and cancel the “Hacienda Holiday

But, Bayley purposely

avoided catering to the wealthy, Taylor explained, because he would have had to hire big
name celebrities such as Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis Jr., and others who would have
demanded extravagant salaries in addition to receiving large commissions from their
overpriced tickets. Bayley wanted his hotel rooms to be affordable and sought to
promote a fam ily atmosphere. He preferred that a moderate and lower-income clientele
fly on his airline and enjoy themselves at his hotel without feeling pressured to spend
exorbitant sums o f money. Bayley felt that his hotel’s location at the beginning o f the
Strip near the airport, would attract families heading north on the highway in their
automobiles. The resort’s pool, go-cart track and other attractions w ould lure them in
and the bargain prices would induce them to attend their stay. Obviously Bayley’s
marketing strategy and maricet niche were remarkably different from those o f his Strip
competitors and m ay have threatened some o f them.
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The Hacienda’s troubles did not end with the Supreme Court’s order to cease
operations. In September 1962, Blatz and Standard, two Southern California airlines,
faced disciplinary action from the CAB for operating flights to Nevada casinos, including
the Hacienda, without CAB approval. Standard Chief Executive O fficer Shields B.
Craft’s airline had been charged with “taking part in various pooling and working
agreements with the Hacienda Hotel, a resort hotel found to have operated an air service
between Los Angeles and Las Vegas without CAB authority.”^^ According to one
newspaper. Standard had apparently violated regulations for several years. A Standard
attorney denied that his airline did business with the Hacienda, though he later conceded
that occasionally some o f the Hacienda pilots had been hired on ju st like other airline
pilots.^' For their part, the commercial airlines charged that Standard wanted to convert
its individual ticket service into a charter operation, which CAB regulations prohibited.
The CAB charged Blatz with “repeatedly violating civil air regulations by failing to
charge fares specified in its tariffs by providing service to persons to whom it had not
sold tickets, and by operating flights without authority to several Nevada cities under
arrangements with gambling casinos ” According to the CAB report, the airline had
agreements with casinos to fly their patrons to Reno, Searchlight, Hawthorne,
W innemucca, and Tonopah.^’
The demise o f the Hacienda Airlines pleased the commercial airlines, the Strip
hotels, and the local press. The junket airline had been an unwanted competitor,
especially for the commercial airlines. But, for the Hacienda management and hotel
employees, it marked the end o f a spectacular operation that powered the hotel’s early
success. The shutdown was briefly overshadowed on December 28, 1964, when Bayley
collapsed in his office and died from a massive heart attack at the age o f 6 4 ." Among
those who attended his funeral were Governor Grant Sawyer, Senator Howard Cannon,
and Hollywood actor Gene Autry. His death appeared in newspapers across the country.
Richard Taylor remembered B a>1^ as a visionary and “one o f the last ‘silver tongued’
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salesmen and promoters who was the backbone and the driving force that made the
Hacienda a success.”^'
Bayley’s junket airline and his promotion o f package deals laid the foundation for
the jim ket business to Las Vegas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, it served
as a model for later hotel junkets offered by MGM, Hilton, Caesars Palace, and Circus
Circus in association with both charters and commercial airlines. In fact, the business
grew to such an extent in the 1970s and 1980s that in 1993, McCarran airport officials
had to build a separate charter terminal to handle the increased passenger volume.
Today, one is overwhelmed by the myriad deals offered by airlines and hotels alike on
the Internet and in travel sections o f Sunday newspapers. Brochures announcing low
airfares and inexpensive rooms regularly appear in travel magazines to entice tourists into
booking a glamorous weekend trip to Las Vegas. Typical is American Airlines, which
touts its “Fly AAway” travel packages to Las Vegas that include airfare, hotel
accommodations, and meals for one reasonable price. Southwest, America West, United,
and Las Vegas-based National Airlines also offer package deals from m any cities in the
United States.
But for all o f their criticism o f Doc Bayley and his airline in the early 1960s, both
the commercial airlines and Las Vegas’ modem resorts later adopted his m odus operandi
o f air travel to Las Vegas for moderate and low-income travelers. In some o f Las
Vegas’s efforts in recent years to promote itself as a family destination. Circus Circus,
Excalibur, and other resorts that cater to the lower-end maricets are building upon a
tradition that Warren Bayley helped establish at both his hotel and his airline almost a
h alf century ago.
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CHAPTERS

A N EW HORIZON: THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION ON COMMERCIAL
AIR TRAVEL IN LAS VEGAS

In 1938, the federal government invoked regulation on the airline industry
following a congressional hearing addressing consumer complaints about safety,
substandard service, and an overall lack o f organization.' By establishing a well-defined
set o f rules for airlines to follow, the government hoped to restore public confidence in
commercial air travel. As a result. Delta, United. TWA, and other commercial air
carriers complied by restructuring their maintenance and safety programs as well as their
operating procedures. They also improved the quality o f their in flight service, and
occasionally lowered airfares to appease the traveling^ublic. Although the airlines made
significant progress by implementing these changes, they still had to contend with other
equally troublesome issues.
For years, commercial air carriers primarily flew to large cities, inconveniencing
customers by requiring them to drive long distances. Also, because regulation limited the
num ber o f airlines serving relatively few destinations nationwide, some air carriers
dominated certain markets, especially at hub airports such as Denver, Chicago, and St.
Louis. As a result, they w ere able to establish their own fares, making air travel
unaffordable for many Americans. Although regulation prevented airlines from charging
customers unreasonably high prices and mandated federal approval for any airfare
changes, still only those customers who could afford them, flew. But after World W ar II,
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when Americans enjoyed more disposable income and vacation tim e, their travel interests
increased and as a result, airlines had much difficulty meeting the demand.
Consequently, m any air carriers had to lease larger and more efficient airplanes to replace
the smaller and less economic ones. Common commercial airline propeller-driven
aircraft, such as the Constellation and Douglas DC-3, gave way in the 1960s to jets like
the Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-9, which had longer fuel ranges, flew at faster speeds,
and reduced travel tim e by at least fifty percent. Soon, those je ts were replaced by more
efficient ones such as the Boeing 737 (for short-hauls), and the wide-bodied Douglas DC10 and Boeing 747, which could transport dozens more passengers longer distances, at a
lower cost per passenger mile. But, operating these aircraft proved to be expensive, and
as a result, airlines raised fares, which quickly ended the surge. Thus, in order to
stimulate demand, in the mid 1960s, airlines had to reduce their fares by as much as SO
percent.’ Once again, customers took advantage o f the low prices, and the passenger
volume soared. This was the trend throughout the 1960s and m uch o f the 1970s. But,
Congress realized that the airline industry needed change that would end these market
fluctuations and provide maricet stability. The only way to accomplish this was to
increase competition. One government report confirmed that “Congress was convinced
that increased competition would benefit the airlines and the public.”’
ha October 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act, which
revolutionized the airline industry. After forty years o f federal oversight, the law
suddenly gave airlines the freedom “to decide where they would fly and what fares they
would charge.”^ It also opened new markets, allowing airlines access to the abimdance
o f passengers in second and third-tier cities never served before by any commercial air
carrier. Customers no longer had to drive to larger cities to catch their flights, a practice
which frequently discouraged many from flying. Deregulation also allowed new air
carriers to penetrate established markets and undercut their competitors b y offering lower

far^ .
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Deregulation initially created chaos in the industry. Some carriers like Pan Am
and Eastern went bankrupt. Others, like United, Delta, and American thrived by
obtaining m ore gates by purchasing more jets or by acquiring or merging with regional
and new carriers. In some places like Mirmeapolis, one airline nearly monopolized the
airport, but in other cities this was not the case. As TW A Las Vegas Station Manager
Duane Busch explained, there was a “massive explosion [in passenger volume] and many
airlines just could not handle it.”' But, unlike many o f these larger cities where major
airlines nearly monopolized the airports. Las Vegas was unique.
Just a year and a half after deregulation, the num ber o f commercial airlines
serving Las Vegas had increased from seven to seventeen. Many new air carriers jumped
at the opportunity to enter the lucrative southern Nevada market. By offering low fares,
they hoped to attract many middle and lower-income customers, a market whose value
had been demonstrated by Doc Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines. While some political leaders
and casino executives worried about using the airport to target low-income passengers,
there was little they could do but adjust. And they did. Circus Circus and Excalibur
pioneered the new low-income maricet niche o f the 1980s and 1990s. Together, the
airlines and Strip hotels began to tap a market that Fremont Street and the bus companies,
as well as Doc Bayley and William J. Moore, had exploited for years.
Because so many tourists in the 1980s and 1990s booked flights on airlines such
as Southwest, America West, Reno Air, United, and United Express, Las Vegas became a
low-yield maricet for the leisure traveler as a result o f competition and discounted
airfares. A t the same time, the city embraced another profitable maricet, business travel.
According to recent statistics, over ten percent o f the Las Vegas m arket accounted for
business travelers and locals.' For Southwest and some other commercial air carriers,
both markets proved to be quite profitable, but for others, they were not. Take the case o f
TW A, which offered eleven daily flights from Las Vegas in the 1970s, but reduced its
flights in the 1980s because it found international markets and domestic long-range
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routes, such as those from San Francisco to JFK, to be m uch more profitable. This was
especially true for TW A, whose fleet consisted m ostly o f wide-body Lockheed L-101 Is
and 747s, which could carry more than 300 passengers.’ Other airlines including Delta
and American also followed suit, but unlike Trans World, they maintained their same
num ber o f flights serving Las Vegas before deregulation. United even increased its
flights, because it was one o f the largest airlines in the world and its sheer volume o f
business allowed it to absorb low profits in the Las Vegas m arket.'
By the late 1980s, with McCarran’s passenger volume surpassing 17 million and
mega-resorts sprouting along the Strip, Las Vegas became an even more attractive venue
for tourists. This proved even more true in the 1990s when the passenger volume
doubled and more mega-resorts appeared. With more seats available, airlines watched
their flight loads significantly rise and resort hotel owners saw their rooms fill up.
Thanks to their discount packages, the airlines helped to reinforce this trend. Western
Airlines, for instance, offered its “Las Vegas Bonus” fare where customers flew round
trip from Los Angeles to Las Vegas for $54 (with restrictions).’ Other airlines also
offered sim ilar fares and cheap package deals that attracted thousands o f customers.
Southwest and America W est Airlines, for instance, began serving Las Vegas in the early
1980s, and they quickly dominated the market by offering competitive fares ju st as
W estern and Hughes AirW est had done in the 1970s. But, the new companies employed
different marketing strategies.
Known as an airline with “no frills,” Southwest immediately challenged the
dominance o f Am erica West, United, Delta, and the other air carriers serving McCarran.
According to Susan Davis, a sales representative for Southwest, the airline catered to all
customers without targeting any specific class. By offering two for the price o f one fares,
and bonus rewards for the num ber o f trips flown. Southwest developed a large and broad
clientele." W ith 169 daily departures and arrivals (soon to be over 200, w hich will allow
Las Vegas to surpass Phoenix as the m ost popular destination within the Southwest
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system), the airline with the motto “fun, low fares, and frequency,” amassed large profits
from the Las Vegas market. Davis points out that the airline “tried to target young
minded’ travelers, but catered to all passengers. .. So there really was no specific focus
on any type o f passenger.” " The airline also strategically focused on a “short haul ”
market where the average flight did not exceed a 500 m ile radius nor a flight time o f
more than one hour. It was also careful to protect its interests by refusing to enter the
reservation systems o f the major carriers, helping to save it from the experience o f Pan
Am and Braniff, which saw many o f their reservations pirated b y airlines that controlled
the system. Southwest also prided itself on entertaining its customers while en route and
promoted vacation-type destinations. In addition, the airline innovated many methods for
rapid turnarounds, deplaning and enplaning passengers in as little as 15 minutes by not
assigning seats. Southwest’s popularity among tourists eventually m ade it the sole tenant
at M cCarran’s “C” Concourse by the late 1990s (an unintentional result o f other airlines
occupying the “D” Gates).
In contrast, America West attempted to focus on the business traveler. As the
airline’s marketing manager Jennifer Myers noted, “because the airline catered to the
business traveler, it provided more flights in certain markets that proved to be more
profitable.” " To accomplish this, America W est scheduled a m ajority o f its flights to
depart from Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and San Francisco, so business travelers
could easily make connecting flights to eastern destinations. M yers explained
that “the airline had a complex system, more so than passengers ju st flying to Las Vegas
to stay there. .. Las Vegas was primarily a connecting airport for a m ajority o f America
W est’s older passengers.” " The airline also created a niche by scheduling many o f its
flights in the evening and late at night (“red-eye flights”), because those times proved to
be the m ost profitable. However, if the business passenger m arket proved to be more
profitable than the leisure traveler one, the airline began scheduling m ore day flights to
accommodate the business traveler. " According to Myers, A m erica W est’s strategy was
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to observe a geographic region to see which airline was the m ost dominant and what their
strategy was. America W est would then move in and offer competitive fares and provide
amenities that the other carriers did not provide in order to capture the lion's share o f the
market.
Adopting a similar philosophy to that o f America W est was Michael Conway,
C hief Executive Officer o f National Airlines, Las Vegas’s “hometown airline,” which
also catered to the business traveler, but in a different market. By offering inexpensive
transcontinental flights from Las Vegas to eastern United States cities such as
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New Yoric, Conway believed that he would attract more
business travelers (and tourists) than his competitors. For instance, passengers could fly
round trip on National from Las Vegas to Miami for $ 2 3 8 ." Because Las Vegas was
such a popular destination for air travelers and a city that attracted more businesses,
Conway felt that it was the ideal base for his airline. He contended that “for a true huband-spoke market to be successful, the hub o f the operation m ust be a strong destination
in and o f itself.” " Also, by using one type o f aircraft like Southwest, he kept the airline’s
maintenance to a minimum.
But, the air carrier quickly went into the red after its first year and a h a lf in
business. Aside from opening on a later date than projected, rising fuel prices consumed
much o f the airline’s capital. In fact it accounted for over forty percent o f the air carrier’s
operating expenses. Other airlines also felt the sting from high oil prices. On a similar
note, part o f Conway’s operation included flights from San Francisco and Los Angeles to
Las Vegas, short-haul routes that were not economically sensible for Boeing 757s. With
m assive debt and insufficient capital from financial backers to support the airline.
National officials filed for bankruptcy in 2000.
O f course, commercial airlines were not the only carriers affected by
deregulation. Years before the historic passage o f that legislation, the Frontier and
Hacienda hotels enjoyed business from customers arriving on charter flights. In the
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1960s and 1970s, United Airlines was the leading commercial air carrier offering charter
flights to Las Vegas. Using DC-8s with seating capacities ranging from 127 to 184 seats
(the airline later used wide-bodied DC-10s with seating capacities exceeding 300), in
1977, the airline transported over 55,000 passengers o f all types to Las Vegas. In fact,
seven years earlier, the airline built its own charter terminal on the far east side o f
McCarran A irport." A fter deregulation. United found itself competing with dozens o f
other charter air carriers, including Sun Country and America Trans Air, which also flew
wide-body aircraft to Las Vegas from munerous cities across the nation. This dramatic
revolution stemmed from deregulation, which permitted charter airlines to fly many o f
the same routes as the scheduled commercial airlines. As a result, McCarran Airport
planners and managers had to alter their expansion plans to allow for construction o f a
separate charter terminal as well as more passenger gates to handle the increased volume
o f charter and regular passengers.
Like the je t in the 1960s, deregulation in 1978 changed the entire commercial air
travel industry. For forty years, the CAB had regulated destinations served by airlines,
often spawning heated court battles as the air carriers fought for the m ost lucrative
maricets. By invoking regulation, the federal government prevented unfair competition
and kept any outside carriers from entering markets served by commercial air carriers. It
also contended that regulation would “alleviate Congressional concern over safety and an
airline’s financial health... because many o f them were near bankruptcy and service was
often unreliable.” " Thus, the federal government firmly believed that regulation was
appropriate for the airline industry. The airlines also supported regulation because it kept
out unwanted competition, thus allowing United, TWA, and other carriers to control
certain markets.
By 1999, air travel had become the m ost popular mode o f transportation for
tourists to southern Nevada. It is “the lifeblood o f Las Vegas, ” claim s Busch. “W ithout
it, the city would not enjoy even half o f the revenue that tourists bring.” But the golden
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age o f air travel to Las Vegas really began in the 1990s when the passenger volume
skyrocketed. Between 1980 and 1990, it doubled 6 om 10 m illion to 20 million. Six
years later, it surpassed 30 million and will undoubtedly hit 40 m illion by 2002 or 2003.
W ith continued improvements in aircraft technology, including larger and more efficient
planes, the passenger volume at McCarran will increase as long as the themed mega
resorts built by entrepreneurs Steve Wynn, K irk Kerkorian, Sheldon Adelson, and others,
continue to draw tourists.
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CHAPTER 4

A NEW LANDSCAPE: MEGA-RESORTS.
TOURISM, AND FREQUENT FLYERS

With an expanding passenger volume, and explosive population growth in the Las
Vegas Valley primarily as a result o f mega-resorts appearing along the Strip in the late
1980s and 1990s, Las Vegas quickly entered a new age. Having earned a reputation as a
city filled with crime, corruption, and vice, especially in the second half o f the twentieth
century. Las Vegas finally rid itself o f its infamous past and became a city dedicated to
serving tourists and residents o f lower, middle, and upper classes. Historian Hal
Rothman points out that “only a generation ago, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Las
Vegas retained its stigma as a sleazy home o f tawdry sex and mobsters....Cleaned up. Las
Vegas was what we [Las Vegans] wanted it to become.” ' This “new” Las Vegas not
only emerged as a m odem gam bler’s paradise with high-tech gaming venues, but also as
a resort town with themed attractions and entertainment for tourists, families, and city
residents. Former W ashington P ost journalist Pete Earley announced in a 2000
publication that “the ‘old’ Las Vegas was dead and a new ’ Las Vegas had risen.”" He
was right.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Las Vegas joined Miami, Orlando, and Phoenix, as
resort cities which experienced unprecedented population growth largely because o f
tourism. However, Las Vegas was unique in that it experienced such remarkable growth
in a shorter period o f time. As Rothman explains, “while Las Vegas became the fastest
growing city in the nation during the 1990s, its population doubled and then nearly
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doubled again as its physical expanse exploded all over the desert.” ' Contributing to this
remarkable growth were the thousands o f tourists who daily passed through M cCarran's
gates, and hundreds o f others who crowded sidewalks, filled the casinos, shopped in
upscale stores, and dined in gourmet restaurants showcasing a variety o f international
cuisines. During this period, the town wimessed nothing short o f a transformation, as
Las Vegas reinvented itself again, thanks to mega-resort entrepreneurs Steve Wynn, Kirk
Kerkorian, Barron Hilton, and others. These hotel icons began a popular trend that
permanently changed Las Vegas from the small “resort town in the desert,” it had been
for years into a booming international destination.
Since the late 1940s, Strip hotels attracted thousands o f tourists by simply
appealing to those who wanted to try their luck at the gaming tables. Aside from the Del
W ebbs and the Thomas Hulls, organized crim e figures also owned m any o f these
properties, and they made millions by creating relatively small, but elegantly decorated
casinos with cheap shows, comped drinks, nicely appointed rooms, and a pool that added
to the lure. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, control o f these resort hotels
gradually changed hands when large corporations came to town and bought them up.
Prior to the revision o f the Corporate Gam ing Act in 1969, new casino owners routinely
underwent investigation by the Nevada Gaming Commission before they were issued a
gaming license. The purpose o f this process was to limit the number o f corporations
entering the gaming industry and preventing them from controlling it."* However, once
the act was passed in 1969, the corporate presence in Las Vegas increased because only
key casino executives w ere investigated. This dramatically changed the entire gaming
and hotel industry on the Strip as it increasingly came under corporate control.
In the 1970s and 1980s hotel icons such as Kirk Kerkorian, Barron Hilton and
others transformed the Strip by building enormous high-rise structures containing
thousands o f rooms, large casinos, and a plethora o f fine dining and entertainment
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options. Though a large num ber o f smaller properties had already been established, these
magnificent structures quickly dominated the hotel industry in Las Vegas because they
drew such large crowds with their amenities and features. But the Strip would grow even
larger. In the late 1980s and 1990s, that trend changed when these properties gave way to
enormous, billion-dollar mega-resorts that drew more crowds, heavily contributed to a
population explosion, and completely changed the resort hotel industry.
In 1989, mega-resort pioneer Steve Wyim’s Mirage inaugurated this new trend.
Four years later, Kerkorian, who sold his MGM Grand Hotel to B ally’s in 1984, and left
town for several years before returning, built a new 5,000 room M GM Grand to
challenge Wyim’s Mirage. In the meantime, William Bennett, ow ner o f Circus Circus
Hotel (he and an associate had purchased it from Jay Samo in 1974), a lower-end
property, built a more elegant resort for guests, the 4,100 room Excalibur, which opened
in 1990. Circus Circus followed this up with the middle-income Luxor in 1993, and
finally the company’s upscale resort, the Mandalay Bay, six years later. These and other
themed resorts attracted millions o f tourists, over 46% o f whom flew to Las Vegas in
1999 on commercial and charter flights.^
Indeed, the hotels and commercial airlines have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship
for decades, and it has only grown with time. In 1989, Las Vegas hotels reported an
89.8% occupancy rate and ju st over 17 million air travelers passed through McCarran’s
gates. In 1993, the num ber o f hotel guests increased by three percent and the passenger
volume increased to over 22 million.^ Certainly this growth can be partly attributed to
more mega-resorts appearing along the Strip. In a recent interview, McCarran Airport
Director Randall W alker agreed that tlie airlines enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with
hotels. He explained how each hotel room generated approximately 350 passengers
annually, and he expected that num ber to remain the same or increase so long as
McCarran continued to feed large numbers o f tourists to The M irage, Caesars Palace,
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Bellagio, and other mega-resorts. But, as this study shows, whenever the Strip hotels
added more rooms, the airport had to expand, and this remained the case into the twentyfirst century.
In January 1980, when TRA received the contract for airport expansion, it
planned for a facility that would accommodate 20 m illion passengers by 2000. The first
phase o f “McCarran 2000,” the most elaborate and expensive airport expansion plan in
the city’s history to date, included terminal expansion by 1.5 million square-feet for 12
baggage claim carousels and 18 gates. It also called for an expanded parking structure
with 1,500 more parking spaces, new cargo facilities, an enlarged air traffic control
tower, and an elaborate airport roadway extension program that included a connection to
a freeway (Interstate 215). All o f this cost the airport S287 million, a price far exceeding
initial projections. Fortunately, tax exempt bonds paid for the project, supplemented by
landing fees, passenger facility charges, retail rental space, and parking and slot machine
revenue.* But, the project’s cost was not the only problem. Statisticians predicted that
McCarran would reach 20 million passengers by 2000, but the airport reached that
milestone in 1990! Because the planners greatly underestimated the increase in tourist
volume, phases two and three o f “McCarran 2000” had to begin immediately.
Those plans called for more airline ticket and rental car counter space, an
expanded baggage claim area, and an enlarged parking structure to nine stories with the
capacity to accommodate 6,500 automobiles and commercial vehicles (in addition to a
remote parking site for overflow). The plans also included construction o f two more
satellite concourses, the “C” gates for Southwest Airlines, and “D” gates for United,
American, Delta, and other airlines. Planners also wanted to build an international
terminal with eight gates for use by Japan Airlines, Mexicana, Canadian, A ir Canada, and
other international carriers. With many o f these foreign airlines flying wide-body
aircraft to McCarran, especially Boeing 767s and DC-1 Os, the airport needed to lengthen
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and reinforce its existing runways and build a third one paralleling the north-south
runway 1-19 (completed in 1988), as well as a fourth paralleling the east-west runway 725 (completed in 1991 and extended in 1997)."
Airport plaimers and officials hoped that these additional facilities would be
sufficient until plans could be drawn for a comprehensive expansion plan in the twentyfirst century. Fortunately, the “D ” concourse provided 26 more gates, enough to relieve
commercial aircraft from having to wait for an available gate. Also it allowed space for
more concessions, stores, restaurants, slot machines, and other revenue producers.
The airport also financially benefited from the Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ), which
allowed international importers duty-fi*ee storage and assembly o f foreign products. It
also “provided substantial savings on duties, fees, and excise taxes.” '" Though some
critics viewed this as potentially scandalous, the FTZ was not only beneficial to the
airport, but also the city in that it helped diversify the metropolitan area’s economy and
benefited the resorts by easing the pressure to raise gaming taxes. More importantly, the
FTZ stimulated free trade, increased cargo business, and enticed businesses such as
Douglas Aircraft, Levi Strauss, Service Merchandise, and other import companies to
move their headquarters to Las V egas." But once again, rapid growth created space
problems. Despite the airport plans for enlarged FTZ facilities, they were still
inadequate. By the late 1990s, officials realized that further expansion would be
necessary as the passenger volume steadily surged toward McCarran’s maximum
capacity o f 55 million travelers.
In 1999, planners conducted a study and concluded that the construction o f a
second major airport would be necessary to alleviate McCarran’s air traffic and terminal
congestion problems. In a letter to the Chairman on the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation, Randall W alker clearly showed the airport’s
desperate need for additional land. H e explained that there were over 550,000 aircraft
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operations annually in an airport whose maximum capacity was 705.000. a figure that
would be easily reached by 2010. Walker then estimated that without expansion, the
average flight would be delayed by at least 20 minutes, costing commercial and charter
air carriers over $ 1,000 per delayed flight.'" Because Las Vegas was a low-yield market,
he feared that the added expense might discourage airlines from offering more flights to
Las Vegas and encourage them to seek more profitable markets. W alker also observed
that the airport had already reached its 2,400 acre capacity with only enough room for
“short and m id-term growth.” '^ He noted that during peak periods. Las Vegas air traffic
controllers handled over 120 hourly arrivals and departures, and any additional flights
would saturate the system.
In 2001. with federal funds becoming available for a new airport near Ivanpah
and the help o f influential Nevada senators Harry Reid and John Ensign, airport officials
devised a new plan to secure additional monies for McCarran to alleviate its congestion,
and prepare the facility to handle its maximum capacity. The centerpiece o f “Vision
2020” is a new airport south o f Las Vegas. Despite opposition from environmentalists
who argued that arrival and departure routes crossing over the Mojave National Preserve
would cause excessive damage (which an extensive SI million airport planning study
proved w rong), the county received approval from the federal government to purchase
6,500 acres o f land (30 m iles south o f the Las Vegas Valley) from the Bureau o f Land
Management for SI 3 million. W hen construction o f the new airport is complete, it will
handle cargo and international flights, in addition to overflow o f scheduled commercial
flights to M cCarran. Dennis Mewshaw, planning m anager for Clark County Department
o f Aviation, estimates that two to four million passengers will pass through the new
airport’s gates by the end o f its first year in operation. The first phase o f construction,
which is slated to begin in 2005, includes a terminal building, two runways, and surface
parking at a price tag o f SI billion.''*
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In addition to the new facility in Ivanpah, other stages o f the plan include more
airline ticket counter space and baggage claim carousels at M cCarran's main terminal. A
third wing will be added to the “D” Concourse (which will provide eleven more gates),
and construction o f a third terminal (including its own parking garage, ticket counters,
and baggage claim facilities) with fourteen gates, eight o f which will be reserved for
international air carrier use. The airport will also build an o ff site 80,000 square-foot
facility for all rental car companies (to make space available for the new baggage claim
carousels), and a new control tower.
Future phases o f the plan also include provisions for the improvement o f other
Clark County airports. To handle more private planes and air tour carrier services. North
Las Vegas Airport will receive a third runway, a new apron, more hangar facilities, and a
new air traffic control tower. Henderson Executive Airport will be funded for
construction o f a new terminal building, a second runway, a new apron, and more shade
hangars.'" The plans also include construction o f a fourth terminal at McCarran (where
Signature Flight Support is currently located) providing ten more gates, and a fifth wing
to be added to the “ D” Concourse, which will provide nine more gates, allowing the
airport to meet its goal o f 120 gates. Excluding the new airport, all o f the additional
expansion outlined in “Vision 2020” is estimated to cost $1.26 billion. According to
Hilarie Grey, public affairs manager for the Department o f Aviation, federal airport
improvement funds and airport revenue will finance the project in addition to bond
issues. 17
Airport officials and the County Commission desperately needed the land in
Ivanpah. McCarran Airport had no further room for significant expansion o f any kind.
Had the federal government not approved the land purchase, the consequences would
have been far reaching throughout southern Nevada. W ithout future passenger growth.
Las V egas’ economy would have plateaued. Because commercial air carriers bring so
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many tourists to town each year, without airport expansion to meet the demand, airport
officials would have to limit the number o f flights serving McCarran. which would
seriously financially impact the airport, city, and hotels.
Had this happened, it would have been a disaster, because increased flights
serving Las Vegas have gone hand in hand with the construction o f the Mirage, second
MGM Grand, Bellagio. the Venetian, Paris, and the other mega-resorts that have
displaced their I950s-era predecessors on the Strip. Moreover, Steve W yim’s impending
reincarnation o f the old Desert Inn will undoubtedly trigger a rippling effect across the
entire north Strip. Already, Frontier Hotel officials are making plans to demolish that
resort to make way for a spectacular successor. A t the same time, the Boyd Group is
pondering several options to prepare their Stardust property for the crowds that the
Desert Inn’s water-themed venue will bring. In addition, the owners o f the small arcades,
restaurants, and shopping centers that separate these hotels from the Riviera, Circus
Circus, and the Sahara are also preparing to demolish their buildings to provide land for
one continuous line o f attractions that will finally allow the north Strip to challenge its
southern competitor for tourist revenue. All projections indicate that, despite the threats
o f Indian casinos, Internet gambling, and fundamentalist Christian opposition. Las Vegas
will continue to grow into the early decades o f the twenty-first century. But if the
experiences o f Reno and Atlantic City have taught Las Vegas’ leadership anything, it is
that the presence o f a modem, high-capacity jetport is the essential foimdation for a
growing resort city.
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EPILOGUE

For decades, southern Nevada has heavily relied on tourism as its m ajor source o f
revenue. Since the early 1930s, millions o f tourists and conventioneers came to the area,
lured by Las Vegas’ continuing ability to reinvent itself. In the 1960s, the low-rise
resorts o f the postwar era gave rise to Caesars Palace, The International, and a new
generation o f plush hotels. Many o f these properties, in turn, were replaced in the 1980s
and 1990s by the spectacular mega-resorts that have made the Strip an international
destination, supported by the equally impressive expansion o f commercial air travel.
The latter played a pivotal role in southern Nevada’s tourist industry by annually
transporting millions o f passengers to Las Vegas. In 1999, commercial and charter
airplanes passed the automobile as the most popular means o f transportation to Las
Vegas. Statistics also indicate that airlines were responsible for the sizable increase in
the num ber o f guests occupying hotel rooms during the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite a
slight decrease in the m id to late 1990s, overall room occupancy was up over the
previous decade. In fact, projections from the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor’s
Authority forecast this growth to continue well into the first half o f the twenty-first
century. Surely McCarran’s passenger volume will certainly reach 40 million by 2001 or
2002, and its maximum capacity o f 55 million within the next five years.
Thanks to improvements in aircraft technology, especially the je t engine,
commercial airlines enjoyed a larger clientele. With speeds nearly twice those o f their
predecessors, je t aircraft cut travel time by at least half, hauled more passengers, and
expanded air travel markets nationwide. Jets were especially useful for long-range
flights, which made air travel accessible and affordable for easterners to fly to Las Vegas
for business or pleasure.
54
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Before Atlantic City emerged in 1978 as a competitor to Las Vegas, many
Americans had never seen a casino. And while Atlantic City’s gambling revenues still
remain higher, that city has not matched Las Vegas in entertainment, shopping, or megaresorts, partially because it has no regularly scheduled airline flights, only charters. Other
casino cities, such as Reno, have also suffered because o f limited airline service.
Following the recent merger between American Airlines and Reno Air (the carrier
offering the most flights out o f Reno as well as between Reno and Las Vegas), the former
totally ended all o f its flights from Reno to Las Vegas. This awarded Southwest a
stronghold in the market (with 12 daily flights) over America West and United (offering
1 daily flight each). Even worse was American’s decision to end all service to Reno,
which had a devastating impact on the city’s tourism. Lake Tahoe suffered as well from
this decision. One o f the reasons for American’s action is that none o f these casino cities
have even approached the profitability that the Las Vegas markets offer commercial
airlines. McCarran’s 800 daily arriving and departing flights bares clear testimony to this
fact.
History clearly indicates that any significant cut in air travel would damage
southern Nevada’s tourist industry, which, in turn, would cripple the region’s economy.
This proved especially true after a devastating terrorist attack on the eastern United States
forced the FAA to ground ail commercial flights nationwide. On September 11,2001,
terrorists hijacked four commercial jets, using them as weapons to cause widespread
destruction and death. Two o f the jets, an American 767 and United 757, crashed into
the upper floors o f World Trade Center in New York, causing both towers to catch fire.
W ithin minutes, the two structures collapsed, resulting in the deaths o f over 5,000
workers. The third jet, an American 767, slammed into the west wing o f the Pentagon,
causing billions o f dollars in damage to the building, and claimed a total o f 189 lives.
The fourth jet, a United 757, crashed ju st outside o f Pittsburgh, killing all 44 o f the
aircraft’s occupants.'
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The FAA’s grounding o f ail commercial flights spawned a massive ripple-like
effect across the country as thousands o f airplanes cluttered airports, millions o f
passengers were stranded, and airlines lost billions o f dollars. Cargo businesses such as
UPS, Fed Ex, and the United States Postal Service also experienced enormous financial
setbacks. Las Vegas also felt the economic backlash o f the FAA’s mandate, especially
when thousands o f Strip hotel workers were laid o ff because the decline in tourism.
With the airlines groimded and not bringing any customers to Las Vegas, officials
from Caesars Palace, Paris, Bellagio, and other mega-resorts, reported that within one
week, room occupancy had declined by as much as 60%, and estimated gaming revenue
losses to be in the tens o f millions. As a result, hotel executives ordered the laying o ff o f
thousands o f employees. They also canceled shows because o f so few ticket sales.
Retail shops in the Forum, Desert Passage, and Showcase Mall reported enormous
revenue losses. And taxicab companies laid off hundreds o f drivers after business
dropped by at least 50%. Las Vegas went into recession.^
After the FAA lifted their mandate on September 18, 2001, the airline and tourist
industries in Las Vegas still have not ftilly recovered. Planes leave the gates with half o f
the passenger seats filled, despite the airlines’ desperate attempts to lure more customers
by offering roimd-trip fares anywhere within the United States for less than $100. The
Strip hotel room weekend occupancy rate has rebounded to 80%, but shows little sign o f
reaching its 95% average anytime soon. Show ticket sales are up, but auditoriums still
have many empty seats. Retail revenue is increasing, but sales are sluggish.^
The terrorist attack on September 11 clearly delineates the dependency o f tourists
on commercial air travel to Las Vegas. Without air carrier service, tourism would
decline so much, that it would indeed, damage the city’s economy. But, with airlines
offering cheap fares, and the federal government taking appropriate measures to ensure
safer skies for the traveling public, millions o f tourists w ill return to Las Vegas. Again
the thunder will boom in the desert.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

N otes

^Lca Vegas Sun (11 September, 2001), la , 3a, 7a
^Las Vegtis R eview -Jourm d (29 Septmber, 2001), 7b.
^Ibid.. Ib, 7b.
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